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U.S. politics is beset by increasing polarization. Ideological clustering is common; par- 
tisan antipathy is increasing; extremity is becoming the norm (Dimock et al. 2014). This 
poses a serious collective problem. Why is it happening? There are two common strands 
of explanation. 
The first is psychological: people exhibit a number of “reasoning biases” that predict- 
ably lead them to strengthen their initial opinions on a given subject matter (Kahneman et 
al.  1982;  Fine  2005).  They  tend  to  interpret  conflicting  evidence  as  supporting  their 
opinions  (Lord  et  al.  1979);  to  seek  out  arguments  that  confirm  their  prior  beliefs 
(Nickerson 1998); to become more confident of the opinions shared by their subgroups 
(Myers and Lamm 1976); and so on. 
The second strand of explanation is sociological: the modern information age has made it 
easier for people to fall into informational traps. They are now able to use social media to 
curate their interlocutors and wind up in “echo chambers” (Sunstein 2017; Nguyen 2018); 
to customize their web browsers to construct a “Daily Me” (Sunstein 2009, 2017); to 
uncritically consume exciting (but often fake) news that supports their views (Vosoughi et 
al. 2018; Lazer et al. 2018; Robson 2018); and so on. 
So we have two strands of explanation for the rise of American polarization. We need 
both. The psychological strand on its own is not enough: in its reliance on fully general 
reasoning tendencies, it cannot explain what has changed, leading to the recent rise of 
polarization. But neither is the sociological strand enough: informational traps are only 
dangerous for those susceptible to them. Imagine a group of people who were completely 
impartial in searching for new information, in weighing conflicting studies, in assessing 
the opinions of their peers, etc. The modern internet wouldn’t force them to end up in 
echo chambers  or  filter  bubbles—in fact,  with  its  unlimited access  to  information,  it 
would free them to form opinions based on ever more diverse and impartial bodies of 
evidence. We should not expect impartial reasoners to polarize, even when placed in the 
modern information age. 
In short, I agree with the standard story: the above-mentioned “reasoning biases” are an 
important component of the polarization process—they are the tendencies which make us 
susceptible  to  modern  informational  traps  (Sunstein  2009,  2017;  Lazer  et  al.  2018; 
Robson 2018). What I disagree with is the claim that these “reasoning biases” are biases. 
Rather: I’ll argue that these tendencies—to interpret conflicting evidence as confirmatory; 
to search for confirming arguments; and to react to discussion by becoming more extreme
—may be the result  of fully rational processes.  In particular,  they can all  arise when 
rational people are sensitive to the fact that some forms of evidence are systematically 
more ambiguous than others. Now, I can’t establish that the way people actually exhibit 
these tendencies is rational. But I can establish that it could be—that our explanation of 
the rise of polarization doesn’t require individual irrationality. 
Why does this matter? Because it changes the nature of the collective problem we face. 
Step back. Whenever we observe a collectively bad outcome for a group of interacting 
people, there are two quite different kinds of explanations we can give: we can locate the 
problem in the choices of the individuals or the structure of their interaction. To illustrate, 
contrast two cases: 
Case 1: We face a heart disease epidemic—we would all be better off if we all 
ate better. 
Case 2: Our fisheries are being depleted—we would all be better off it we all 
fished less. 
The bad outcome in Case 1 is due to individual failings: each of us would have a better 
outcome if we unilaterally ate better—we are irrational to overeat. Thus the collectively 
bad  outcome  “filters  up”  from  suboptimal  choices  of  the  individuals.  Call  this  an 
individual problem. In contrast, the bad outcome in Case 2 is due to structural failings: 
none of us could get a better outcome by unilaterally changing our decision—we are 
rational to overfish. The problem is that we are caught in a tragedy of the commons: 
although the total fish population would be larger (and so fishers more productive) if 
everyone fished less, the best way for an individual to maximize their catch is to overfish 
(Hardin 1968). Thus the collectively bad outcome “filters down” from the suboptimal 
structure of the group. Call this a structural problem. 
To put it bluntly: individual problems arise because people are dumb; structural problems 
arise because people are smart.  You solve an individual problem by getting people to 
make  better  choices—for  example,  by  educating  them  about  nutrition.  You  solve  a 
structural problem by changing the choices they face—for example, imposing fines for 
overfishing. 
Back to politics. As commonly articulated, the standard story represents polarization as 
an  individual  problem:  it  implies  that  polarization  arises,  ultimately,  from  irrational 
informational choices on behalf of individuals. It therefore predicts that the solution will 
require teaching people to make better ones. Educate them; inform them; improve them. 
If I’m right, this is a mistake. The informational choices that drive polarization are not 
irrational or suboptimal. Like the tragedy of the commons, polarization is a structural 
problem. It arises because people are exquisitely sensitive to the informational problems 
they face—because they are smart. It doesn’t require educating them; it requires altering 
the choices they face. 
So much for motivation; here are the three reasoning tendencies I will focus on: 
Biased assimilation: People tend to interpret conflicting evidence as supporting 
their prior beliefs (Lord et al. 1979) 
Confirmation bias: People tend to seek out new arguments that confirm their 
prior beliefs (Nickerson 1998). 
Group  polarization:  When  people  discuss  their  opinions  in  groups,  their 
opinions  tend to  become more extreme in  the  direction of  the  group’s  initial 
inclination (Myers and Lamm 1976). 
How  could  these  tendencies  be  rational?  The  answer  I’ll  give  relies  on  three 
epistemological facts. 
Fact 1:  Some types of evidence are more ambiguous  than others: it  is harder 
(even for rational people) to know the rational way to react to them. 
To illustrate, compare two cases. The question is whether the coin I just flipped landed 
heads. First  case: all  you know is that it’s a fair coin. It’s obvious that this evidence 
should  lead  you  to  be  50-50  on  whether  the  coin  will  land  heads—the  evidence  is 
unambiguous. Second case: you know it’s a fair coin; after flipping it, with a slight grin I 
say, “You might want to think about heads.”  This might be evidence that it landed heads. 
But maybe the grin indicates that I’m trying to trick you, and it’s actually evidence that it 
landed tails. But maybe I’m thinking that you’ll think that, and the grin indicates that I’m 
trying to double-trick you—in which case it’s actually evidence for heads!  But maybe… 
You see where this is going.   In short, it’s far from obvious whether my comment should 
lead you to be more or less than 50-50 confident that the coin landed heads—in other 
words, this evidence is ambiguous. 
Why does evidential ambiguity matter? Because of the second epistemological fact: 
Fact 2:  The more ambiguous a piece of evidence is,  the weaker  it  is:  if  you 
should be quite unsure how you should react to a piece of evidence, then that 
evidence shouldn’t lead to a radical shift in your opinion. 
For example, in response to my comment that “You might want to think about heads,” it 
might be reasonable to be more confident than not that it landed heads—but it is certainly 
not reasonable to be very confident it landed heads.  Contrast this with a third case: I 
flatly say “It landed heads.” In this third case, you should be very confident it landed 
heads. The reason for the difference in strength of evidence is due to the fact that in the 
former case the evidence is ambiguous, while in the latter case it’s not.
Why are Facts 1 and 2 important? Because rational people can use them to guide their 
choices: 
Fact  3:  Some  information-gathering  strategies  will  predictably  yield  more 
ambiguous (hence weaker) evidence than others. 
For example, suppose you can choose whether (1) I make a comment about the coin in 
person—with all the facial and inflectional subtleties that involves—or (2) I simply send 
either the word ‘heads’ or ‘tails’ over text message. You can expect that the evidence 
you’d receive from (1) will be more ambiguous—and so, by Fact 2, weaker—than the 
evidence you’d receive from (2). So it could be rational to prefer (2) to (1). 
Philosophers and economists have given various models of ambiguous evidence (Levi 
1974; Joyce 2005; Dorst 2018), but they all agree on Facts 1–3. Here’s why these facts 
are important: the ambiguity of a piece of evidence is correlated with whether it confirms 
or  disconfirms  your  prior  beliefs.  That  is,  there  are  fairly  general  settings  in  which 
rational people can expect that receiving evidence that (probably) confirms their opinion 
will  result  in  less  evidential  ambiguity  than  receiving  evidence  that  (probably) 
disconfirms their opinions. Since the former will (other things equal) be stronger, it can 
thereby be rational to choose to receive it—even though doing so predictably leads to 
strengthening prior beliefs.  I’ll first explain two general reasoning scenarios in which 1
this dynamic occurs, and then discuss how our analysis of them can rationalize biased 
assimilation, confirmation bias, and group polarization. 
First  reasoning  scenario:  exploring  explanations.  You  believe  something—say,  that 
lowering the corporate tax doesn’t help the economy. You are presented with conflicting 
pieces of evidence (studies, news items, etc.) E1 and E2—the former tells in favor of this 
belief, the latter tells against it. For example, suppose E1 is a study of five countries that 
lowered  the  corporate  tax  but  didn’t  see  significant  changes  in  economic  growth; 
meanwhile E2 is a study of five countries that lowered the corporate tax and did see a rise 
in economic growth. You only have time to scrutinize one of these studies more closely—
to examine it for methodological flaws, mistaken assumptions, and to (more generally) 
explore alternative explanations that may remove the study’s support for its conclusion. 
 This can be given a rigorous formulation in a Bayesian setting—Salow (2017) shows how.  He offers a 1
strategy to avoid the result, but it can be shown that this strategy works only if it rules out evidential 
ambiguity entirely (Dorst 2018).
For example,  you might  look closer  at  E2  to see what  other  economic changes were 
happening during the time studied that could account for the rise in growth. 
Which  strategy—scrutinizing  E1  or  E2—is  rational,  given  your  background  beliefs? 
Here’s the crucial fact about this reasoning scenario: successfully finding an alternative 
explanation leads to evidence that is less ambiguous than trying and failing to find such 
an explanation. Start with an example. You are scrutinizing E2. Case One: you find an 
alternative explanation—you realize that the study took place during a global economic 
boom. Upon discovering this, you should think, “Of course economic growth was rising
—there’s no reason to think it was the lowering of corporate taxes that did it.” In other 
words, when you successfully debunk the study, you wind up with unambiguous evidence
—you know exactly how to react. Case Two: you think about the study for a while, but 
come up  with  no  good alternative  explanation  of  the  rising  economic  growth.  Upon 
failing to discover an explanation, you should think, “Maybe there’s no other explanation
—in which case this study does support cutting the corporate tax. But on the other hand, 
maybe there’s a perfectly good explanation and I just haven’t thought of it yet.” In other 
words, when you fail to debunk the study, you wind up with ambiguous evidence: you 
should be unsure whether (1) there is no available alternative explanation, or (2) there is 
one that you should have (but didn’t) think of. 
More  generally,  when  you  set  out  to  debunk  a  piece  of  evidence,  there  are  two 
possibilities: either (1) there is an available alternative explanation, or (2) there is none. If 
(1),  then  the  evidence  doesn’t  actually  support  its  conclusion;  if  (2),  then  it  does. 
Crucially, if you find an alternative explanation, then you know that you’re in possibility 
(1)—you have unambiguous evidence. But if you fail to find an alternative explanation, 
you don’t  know whether  that’s  because you’re  in  case  (2)—where there  is  none—or 
instead because you’re in case (1)—where there is one, but you’ve (irrationally) failed to 
generate it. So if you fail to find an alternative explanation, you wind up with ambiguous 
evidence. By Fact 2, that means that trying and failing to find an alternative explanation 
provides you with weaker evidence than successfully finding one. 
Where does this  leave us? You can try to debunk either E1 or E2.  If  your attempt is 
successful, that’ll give you less ambiguous—hence stronger—evidence than if your at- 
tempt is unsuccessful. Since rational people try to get the strongest evidence possible, 
you should try to debunk the one that you think you’re most likely to succeed at de- 
bunking. Which one is that? The one that tells against your belief, of course! (You have 
reason to think that evidence against your belief is more likely to be misleading than 
evidence in its favor—otherwise you wouldn’t believe it!) Upshot: if you’re sensitive to 
evidential ambiguity, then when presented with conflicting studies it is rational—other 
things equal—to try to debunk the one that conflicts with your prior beliefs. 
That  covers  exploring  explanations—our  first  general  reasoning  scenario  where 
evidential  ambiguity  is  predictably  correlated  with  your  prior  beliefs.  The  second 
scenario is assessing arguments. Observation: when you are presented with (minimally 
reasonable) arguments for a claim, this tends to provide you with more evidence in favor 
of that claim than against it. This may seem obvious—that’s the point of arguments, after 
all. But the reason is actually quite subtle—it hinges on evidential ambiguity. 
You  might  think  that  hearing  an  argument  for  a  claim C always  provides  you  with 
evidence in favor of C. But that’s not right—sometimes it provides evidence against C. 
Example: we know that a lawyer will try to construct the best argument possible for the 
claim that her client is innocent. Suppose that upon hearing her argument we can tell that 
it’s quite a bad one. Then it actually provides evidence that her client is guilty—for upon 
hearing  it  we  should  think,  “That’s  a  bad  argument.  If  he  was  innocent,  she  could 
probably construct a better one. So he’s probably not innocent.” In short, the mere fact 
that you’re hearing an argument in favor of a claim doesn’t mean that you’re getting 
evidence for it. 
The real reason why arguments tend to provide evidence for their conclusions has to do 
with the differing levels of evidential ambiguity that they generate—and, in particular, 
with our (in)ability to recognize whether they are good or bad arguments. The issue is 
that  bad arguments  tend to masquerade as  good ones—and thereby mislead you into 
thinking  that  they’re  good ones—whereas  good arguments  rarely  masquerade  as  bad 
ones. So when you come across a good argument, you’ll have relatively little reason to 
think that it’s a bad one; but when you come across a bad one, you’ll have relatively more 
(misleading) reason to think that it’s a good one. 
Now consider what happens when you are presented with an argument for claim C. Either 
(1) it’s a good argument, or (2) it’s a bad one. If (1), then it provides evidence for C; if 
(2),  then it  provides evidence against  C. The crucial asymmetry is your (in)ability to 
recognize whether you’re in case (1) or (2). If (1) it’s a good argument, you should be 
relatively sure that it’s good—thus you have relatively unambiguous evidence in favor of 
C. But if (2) it’s a bad argument, then since it will be masquerading as a good one, you 
should be relatively unsure that it’s bad—thus you have relatively ambiguous evidence 
against  C. By Fact 2,  ambiguous evidence is weaker than unambiguous evidence. So 
being presented with a good argument for C provides relatively strong evidence for C, 
whereas being presented with a bad argument provides relatively weak evidence against 
it. This is why, on the whole, hearing arguments for C tends to give you more evidence in 
favor of C than against it. 
Where  does  this  leave  us?  Suppose  you  face  a  choice  between  hearing  one  of  two 
arguments, A1 or A2—one in favor of your prior belief, one against it. If the one you 
choose  is  good,  being  presented  with  it  will  provide  less  ambiguous  (so  stronger) 
evidence than if it’s bad. Since you should try to get the strongest evidence possible, you 
should choose to be presented with the argument that you think is most likely to be good. 
Which one is that? The one that argues in favor of your prior belief, of course! (You have 
reason to think there are more good arguments for your belief than against it— otherwise 
you wouldn’t  believe it!)  Upshot:  if  you’re sensitive to evidential  ambiguity and can 
choose between hearing two arguments, it is rational—other things equal—to listen to the 
one that supports your prior beliefs. 
I’ve argued that there are two general reasoning scenarios—exploring explanations and 
assessing arguments—in which rational sensitivity to evidential ambiguity can lead you 
to  prefer  an  information-search  strategy  that  can  be  expected  to  confirm  your  prior 
beliefs. Suppose this is right. Then our psychological biases are rational. 
First,  biased  assimilation—people’s  tendency  to  interpret  conflicting  evidence  as 
supporting their prior beliefs. The empirical regularity appears to be due to the fact that 
people spend more energy trying to debunk the piece of evidence that tells against their 
prior opinions than the piece tells in favor of them (Lord et al. 1979; Kelly 2008). This 
should sound familiar: it is precisely this strategy which I argued is rational in the context 
of exploring explanations. Finding an explanation results in less ambiguity than failing to 
find one. A rational person who’s interested in the truth should be trying to get strong 
evidence,  and  so  to  avoid  ambiguity.  That  means—other  things  equal—they  should 
search for alternative explanations in the place they expect to find them, focusing on 
debunking the evidence that conflicts with their prior beliefs. So rational people exhibit 
biased assimilation. 
Second, confirmation bias—people’s tendency to seek out new arguments that confirm 
their prior beliefs. That is, if people are given a choice of which slant of argument to hear 
(or—what comes to the same thing—which news source to watch),  they will  tend to 
choose the one that agrees with their opinion. This should sound familiar: it is precisely 
the strategy I argued is rational in the context of argument assessment. Hearing a good 
argument  results  in  less  ambiguity  than  hearing  a  bad  one.  A rational  person  who’s 
interested in the truth should be trying to get strong evidence, and so to avoid ambiguity. 
That means—other things equal—they should prefer hearing arguments that they expect 
to be good, rather than those they expect to be bad. And, in general, they should expect 
arguments that agree with their beliefs to be better than those that disagree with them. So 
rational people exhibit confirmation bias. 
Third, group polarization—the tendency for a group’s opinion to become more extreme 
after  discussion,  in  the  same direction  as  the  group’s  initial  tendency.  The  empirical 
favor of the group’s initial opinion than against it; and second, people are influenced by 
merely hearing of the opinions of others (Isenberg 1986; Baron et al. 1996). We can also 
use our results to explain why these effects could be rational. The first one is easy. We’ve 
seen that evidential ambiguity explains why being presented with arguments in favor of a 
claim C tends to provide you with evidence in its favor. Since groups that have an initial 
tendency to believe C will tend to know more arguments in favor of it than against it, 
sharing them will tend to provide more evidence for C than against it. 
What about the effect of others’ opinions? In general, learning that others believe some 
claim  C  provides  evidence  for  C.  However,  in  our  political  context  it’s  common 
knowledge that loads of people agree with your views and loads of people disagree with 
them. So shouldn’t these conflicting bits of evidence balance out? No—for we’re back in 
our  exploring-explanations  scenario.  You’re  presented  with  two  pieces  of  conflicting 
evidence: these people all agree with your belief; but these people all disagree with it. 
When you have conflicting evidence and other things are equal, what’s the rational thing 
to do? Spend more energy debunking the evidence that conflicts with your prior beliefs! 
It’s therefore rational to spend time coming up with alternative explanations for why your 
political  opponents  disagree  with  you—and  thus  (upon  coming  up  with  such 
explanations) rational to give more weight to the political opinions of those who agree 
with you.  So rational people also exhibit group polarization. 
In short: there’s reason to think that even fully rational people—those who are exquisitely 
sensitive to the potential ambiguity of their evidence—would tend to interpret conflicting 
evidence as confirmatory, tend to search for confirming arguments, and tend to react to 
group discussion by becoming more extreme. If that’s right, then the fact that you and I 
exhibit  these  tendencies  is  no  indictment.  Rather,  it  may reveal  just  how exquisitely 
sensitive to our evidential situation we are. 
Let’s pull the strands together. We need to appeal to both new sociological trends and 
general  psychological  tendencies  in  order  to  explain  the  recent  rise  of  political 
polarization.  Many  construe  this  rise  as  an  individual  problem—as  a  case  where 
suboptimal individual choices explain the suboptimal collective outcome. I’ve argued that 
this may be a mistake. When we pay close attention to the subtle informational choices 
people face—in particular, the way in which they must navigate ambiguous evidence—
we see that the relevant psychological tendencies may reveal optimal individual choices. 
If that’s right, then we face a structural problem: the modern internet has created a social-
informational  situation  in  which  optimal  individual  choices  give  rise  to  suboptimal 
collective outcomes. 
If this is right, we should think of political polarization less as a health epidemic and 
more as a tragedy of the commons. That means two things. First, it means focusing less 
on changing the choices people make, and more on changing the options they’re given. 
And second, it  means recognizing just  how smart the “other side” is:  that those who 
disagree with you may do so for reasons that are subtly—exquisitely—rational. 
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